Dilemma the Sixty-FifthThings Without A Cause

‘Venerable Nāgasena, there are found beings in the world who have come into existence through Karma, and others who are the result of a cause, and others produced by the seasons. Tell me—is there any thing that does not fall under any one of these three heads?’
‘ There are two such things, O king. And what are the two? Space, O king, and Nirvāṇa.’
‘Now do not spoil the word of the Conquerors, Nāgasena, nor answer a question without knowing what you say!’
‘What, pray, is it I have said, O king, that you should address me thus?’
‘Venerable Nāgasena, that is right what you said in respect of space. But with hundreds of reasons did the Blessed One proclaim to his disciples the way to the realisation of Nirvāṇa. And yet you say that Nirvāṇa is not the result of any cause!’
‘No doubt, O king, the Blessed One gave hundreds of reasons for our entering on the way to the realisation of Nirvāṇa. But he never told us of a cause out of which Nirvāṇa could be said to be produced.’
‘Now in this, Nāgasena, we have passed from darkness into greater darkness, from a jungle into a denser jungle, from a thicket into a deeper thicket—inasmuch as you say there is a cause for the realisation of Nirvāṇa, but no cause from which it can arise. If, Nāgasena, there be a cause of the realisation of Nirvāṇa, then we must expect to find a cause of the origin of Nirvāṇa. just, Nāgasena, as because the son has a father, therefore we ought to expect that that father had a father—or because the pupil has a teacher, therefore we ought to expect that the teacher had a teacher—or because the plant came from a seed, therefore we ought to expect that the seed too had come from a seed —just so, Nāgasena, if there be a reason for the realisation of Nirvāṇa, we ought to expect that there is a reason too for its origin—just as if we saw the top of a tree, or of a creeper, we should conclude that it had a middle part, and a root.’
‘Nirvāṇa, O king, is unproduceable, and no cause for its origin has been declared.’
‘Come now, Nāgasena, give me a reason for this. Convince me by argument, so that I may know how it is that while there is a cause that will bring about the realisation of Nirvāṇa, there is no cause that will bring about Nirvāṇa itself.’
‘Then, O king, give ear attentively, and listen well, and I will tell you what the reason is. Could a man, O king, by his ordinary power, go up from hence to the Himālaya, the king of mountains?’
‘Yes, Sir, he could.’
‘But could a man, by his ordinary power, bring the Himālaya mountains here?’
‘Certainly not, Sir.’
‘Well! therefore is it that while a cause for the realisation of Nirvāṇa can be declared, the cause of its origin can not. And could a man, O king, by his ordinary power cross over the great ocean in a ship, and so go to the further shore of it?’
‘Yes, Sir, he could.’
‘But could a man by his ordinary power bring the further shore of the ocean here?’
‘Certainly not, Sir.’
‘Well! so is it that while a cause for the realisation of Nirvāṇa can be declared, the cause of its origin can not. And why not? Because Nirvāṇa is not put together of any qualities.’
‘What, Sir! is it not put together?’
‘No, O king. It is uncompounded, not made of anything. Of Nirvāṇa, O king, it cannot be said that it has been produced, or not been produced, or that it can be produced, that it is past or future or present, that it is perceptible by the eye or the ear or the nose or the tongue, or by the sense of touch.’
‘But if so, Nāgasena, then you are only showing us how Nirvāṇa is a condition that does not exist. There can be no such thing as Nirvāṇa.’
‘Nirvāṇa exists, O king. And it is perceptible to the mind. By means of his pure heart, refined and straight, free from the obstacles, free from low cravings, that disciple of the Noble Ones who has fully attained can see Nirvāṇa.’
‘Then what, Sir, is Nirvāṇa? Such a Nirvāṇa (I mean) as can be explained by similes. Convince me by argument how far the fact of its existence can be explained by similes.’
‘Is there such a thing, O king, as wind?’
‘Yes, of course.’
‘Show it me then, I pray you, O king—whether by its colour, or its form, whether as thin or thick, or short or long!’
‘But wind, Nāgasena, cannot be pointed out in that way. It is not of such a nature that it can be taken into the hand or squeezed. But it exists all the same.’
‘If you can’t show me the wind, then there can’t be such a thing.’
‘But I know there is, Nāgasena. That wind exists I am convinced, though I cannot show it you.’
‘Well! just so, O king, does Nirvāṇa exist, though it cannot be shown to you in colour or in form.’
‘Very good, Nāgasena! That is so, and I accept it as you say.’
Here ends the dilemma as to Nirvāṇa.